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Abstract Communication protocols enable structured information exchanges
between different entities. A description, at different levels of detail, is neces-
sary for many applications, such as interoperability or security audits. When
such a description is not available, one can resort to protocol reverse engineer-
ing to infer the format of the messages exchanges or of a model of the protocol.
During the past 12 years, several tools have been developed in order to auto-
mate, entirely or partially, the protocol inference process. Each of those tools
has been developed with a specific application goal for the inferred model,
leading to specific needs, and thus different strengths and limitations. After
identifying key challenges, the paper presents a survey of protocol reverse en-
gineering tools developed in the last decade. We consider tools focusing on the
inference of the format of individual messages or of the grammar of sequences
of messages. Finally, we propose a classification of these tools according to
different criteria, that is aimed at providing relevant insights about the tech-
niques used by each of these tools and comparatively to other tools, for the
classification of messages, the inference of their format or of the grammar of
the protocol. This classification also permits to identify technical areas that
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are not sufficiently explored so far and that require further development in the
future.
Keywords Reverse engineering · Protocol inference · Data structure
inference · Network trace analysis · Binary application analysis
1 Introduction
Communication protocols allow several components to exchange messages in a
consistent way. Protocols are widely used in networks and telecommunications
domains. A protocol may be published in an open standard or proprietary, thus
unknown from the final users. Protocol reverse engineering is mainly useful in
this second case, in the context of undocumented and non-standardized closed
protocols.
Reverse engineering of protocols consists in deriving a model of the com-
munications established between several components that implement this pro-
tocol, without any a priori knowledge of this protocol.
The Samba project is a popular example of protocol reverse engineering
projects [42]. It offers an open-source implementation of SMB/CIFS protocols
for Linux clients, enabling Linux and Windows systems to inter-operate. At
the beginning of the project, in 1992, it was mainly based on manual reversing,
a tricky and time consuming work, whose success is tightly linked to the skills
of the analyst. Moreover, keeping pace with a protocol evolutions was a real
challenge.
Supporting interoperability is not the only motivation for using reverse
engineering. Simulation of network protocols [31,22,41,11] is another
application domain. A network simulator is useful to quickly prototype some
specific tests of a protocol whereas performing such tests on a real implemen-
tation may be tedious and in some cases practically impossible. It is also useful
to carry out some statistical experiments and sensitivity analyses. Finally, a
network simulator may replay, in various environments, network traces and
possibly adapt them. Replaying network packets is relevant e.g., to analyze
a network attack or to develop honeypots that can interact with attackers in
order to record and analyze their behavior.
Software security audits is another relevant application domain of pro-
tocols reverse engineering [26,13,23]. This application domain is closely linked
to the previous one but its main goal differs: a component is solicited under var-
ious scenarios to check whether it correctly handles communications whatever
their context. Thus, a model of the protocol may be used in order to develop
smart fuzzers useful for testing the robustness of the protocol implementation.
These fuzzers can generate messages towards a component by relaxing some
constraints on some message fields. Messages that trigger a vulnerability can
be used to build signatures integrated in a network intrusion detection system.
Malware protocol analysis [8,10,14] also relies on protocol reverse en-
gineering. Indeed, a lot of malware, such as bots for example, use network
protocols to communicate with their Command & Control server. Reverse
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engineering these protocols is useful to identify some crucial information re-
garding the location of the botnet master, a date, an imminent attack, attack
targets, etc, and as a consequence, allows to anticipate an attack occurrence
and react accordingly.
Finally, protocol reverse engineering can also be used to support network
protocol conformance testing. It consists in checking whether a software
correctly implements a network protocol whose specification is known. Reverse
engineering enables to get a model of the protocol, from the implementation
of the software under study and to check whether this model is compliant with
the specification of the protocol or not.
During the last decade, several protocol reverse engineering tools have been
developed. A brief summary of the state of the art is reported in [32], by Li
and Chen in 2011. However, the review presented in this paper is incomplete
and does not provide a comparative and synthetic analysis of the different ap-
proaches developed so far. The state of the art proposed by Narayan et al. [37]
in 2015 is more complete and presents recent tools developed for reverse engi-
neering. Compared to these papers, our contributions consist in first discussing
the main challenges that have to be addressed by protocol reverse engineering
tools, then reviewing how these challenges are tackled by each tool. A classifi-
cation is then proposed providing a synthetic comparative analysis of 19 state
of the art tools. This analysis also highlights the open issues that still need to
be addressed. In addition, compared to [37], we extend the scope of the study
to tools aimed at reverse engineering complex data structures.
The different tools surveyed in this paper are discussed according to the
techniques used for the inference of message format and/or the grammar of
the protocol. The inference process is based on the analysis either of network
traces (called network inference) or on application execution traces (called ap-
plication inference). Our classification also distinguishes whether the inference
relies on a passive approach (i.e., using an initially observed data set) or on an
active approach (i.e., the observations are based on a controlled execution of
the system). In particular, the following conclusions have been derived from
the comparative analysis of 19 protocol reverse engineering tools developed
since 2004:
1. Protocol reverse engineering tools based on network traces have been sub-
ject to a large amount of research with significant advances in this area.
Automated approaches are now available to support the various steps for
the reverse engineering process: from data collection up to the generation
of model describing the protocol.
2. Protocol reverse engineering tools based on network traces generally focus
of the classification of protocol messages and on the inference of a grammar
of the protocol. On the other hand, protocol reverse engineering tools based
on application execution traces mainly address the inference of the format
of the messages exchanged by the application, without initially classifying
the messages using e.g., alignment techniques.
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3. New active approaches have been developed to perform both message for-
mat and protocol grammar inference using both network and application
inference.
4. Since 2010, an increasing research effort targeted the reverse engineering
of complex data structures, e.g. to improve the debugging of binary appli-
cations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the terminology asso-
ciated to protocol reverse engineering. Section 3 is dedicated to the different
challenges. The evolution and the comparative analysis of protocol reverse en-
gineering tools and associated techniques are detailed in Section 4. Section 5
provides a classification of these tools. Finally, Section 6 proposes some per-
spectives to this research work.
2 Terminology
Several studies [22,41,13,4,21,5] propose definitions of important notions for
protocol reverse engineering. These terms aim at defining both the compo-
nents that are involved in the communication as well as the structure of the
communication and the exchanged messages. To our knowledge, there is no
general consensus on these definitions. In the following, we define the main
concepts used in this paper, most of them correspond to the most frequently
used terms in the publications cited above.
A protocol is composed of messages, which correspond to protocol data
units (PDU ). The messages are grouped into classes of messages, identified
by a type. A message is composed of fields, encoded according to a format.
Messages are exchanged according to a grammar. Let us note, that, in the rest
of the paper, we consider that a data structure, as used in various applications,
also corresponds to a message format.
To illustrate these terms, let us consider the example of the TCP protocol
for the establishment of a connection, which uses the three classes of messages:
{Syn, Syn-Ack, Ack}. The grammar of the protocol stipulates that, when
component A establishes a connection with component B: 1) A must send the
Syn message, 2) B must respond with the Syn-Ack message, and 3) A must
finalize the establishment of the connection with the Ack message. The format
of Syn messages is given in Figure 1. This message class corresponds to a set
of messages that are identified by the fact that the Syn bit of the flags field
is set to 1 and the other bits are set to 0, which corresponds to the value 0x2
for the flags field. The categorization of a message in the Syn class does not
depend on the other fields of the message, whose values may change from one
communication to another.
Protocol reverse engineering techniques are most of the time classified into
two categories: protocol reverse engineering based on the analysis of messages
exchanged between two components (which we call network inference), or, pro-
tocol reverse engineering based on the analysis of the application itself (which
we call application inference). A sequence of messages exchanged between
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source port destination port
sequence number
acknowledgement number
hdr length padding flags
checksum urgent pointer
window
options...
0x00
0x10
0x20
0x30
0x40
0x50
0x...
0 4 8 C
Fig. 1 TCP SYN packet format
two components is called a network trace. An application inference consists
in analysing the code (source or binary) or in analysing an execution trace (a
sequence of binary instructions). These two categories of protocol reverse en-
gineering techniques can also be differentiated according to the inference type:
passive or active. Active inference stimulates the system in order to discover
information or to validate previous information. At the opposite, passive in-
ference is only based on captured messages, without stimulating the system.
Thus, a tool can perform: network passive inference, network active inference,
application passive inference or application active inference.
3 Protocol reverse engineering challenges
Protocol reverse engineering raises several challenges, not all of them are rele-
vant for each study. This section first presents the different steps of the reverse
engineering of protocols. The challenges associated to each step are then dis-
cussed.
The preliminary phase of protocol reverse engineering should be dedicated
to the identification and characterization of the environment. This phase is
important but is out of the scope of this paper. Based on the knowledge of
the environment, the analyst can start the observation step, which consists
in installing in the environment appropriate means for collecting network or
execution traces. The next step consists in sanitizing these traces in order
to obtain the relevant messages of the protocol under study. The last step
consists in carrying out the inference of the message format or the protocol
grammar, from the messages obtained at the previous step. These different
steps are executed in an iterative process and usually rely on the expertise
and the intuition of the analyst. The success of the reverse engineering activity
heavily relies on the intuition and the expertise of the analyst, supported by
the efficiency of the tools used to automate the inference. As our paper is
focused on protocol reverse engineering tools, we do not identify steps which
specifically require an analyst intervention or can benefit from it. As there
are few tools targeting earlier steps, this work usually has to be performed
manually.
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Figure 2 illustrates the protocol reverse engineering process, and highlight
the main challenges associated to each step. These challenges are presented in
the following subsections.
probe
placement
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message
format
protocol
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Fig. 2 Protocol reverse engineering steps with associated challenges
3.1 Observation step
The inference is based on the gathering of a set of traces thanks to the ob-
servation of a communication channel. Two challenges are associated to this
observation step: probe placement and traces generation.
Probe placement is essential to capture data required for protocol reverse
engineering. Challenges for network inference differ from application inference.
For network inference, probe placement may become quite difficult if for in-
stance, applications use several protocols to communicate, each protocol on
different channels. It is necessary to identify the corresponding channels. Fur-
thermore, one protocol may use different channels, thus, one probe per used
channel is required. This induces a synchronization challenge to keep pace with
the order of messages. A weak probe placement may lead to message leaks,
and thus to an incomplete inference. Some application domains may not suffer
from this incompleteness but others where replay is a goal may lead to irrele-
vant results. If a protocol under study is encapsulated in encrypted channels,
the placement of the probes may become tricky. For instance, it may be nec-
essary to implement the probe in the application itself, at the interface of the
cryptographic libraries, in order to be able to gather decrypted messages. One
solution consists in setting a breakpoint just after the decryption routine, in
order to extract the plain message.
This challenge is more difficult for application inference which is based
on the analysis of execution traces. Thus, not only the probe must produce
the sequence of instructions of the application during messages processing, but
also the history of the system state execution. Many solutions exist (debuggers,
instumentation of the binary, virtualisation. . . ) but each of these solutions has
to address different challenges: the application may have some code protection
(code control integrity, anti-debug,. . . ), or simply to deal with a slowdown of
the application which may lead to a loss of packets due to timing errors.
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The quality of collected (network or execution) traces depends on the
probes placement, and also on the observation duration. A too short observa-
tion phase may lead to a trace which does not contain a set of all the possible
message sequences. Again, such a trace may lead to an incomplete inference.
Thus, it is important to identify when the trace is sufficiently rich to be ex-
ploitable. This depends on the components involved in the protocol as well as
on their communication frequency. In some cases, to obtain more quickly some
appropriate traces, the analyst may adopt an active approach, by stimulating
the system.
3.2 Pre-processing step
The pre-processing of collected traces is closely linked to the previous step.
It may be difficult to achieve if the analyst could not place the probe ideally.
In that case, collected traces may contain irrelevant information that have to
be filtered out. Furthermore, messages relevant to protocol reverse engineer-
ing may be 1) encapsulated in another protocol; 2) split into several packets
transferred in multiple exchanges or 3) observed among messages belonging to
other protocols.
Thus, a first challenge in this pre-processing step is to correctly sanitize
traces in order to reconstruct appropriate messages. This corresponds to data
sanitization. This step is required for both network and application inference.
Nevertheless, the latter has to cope with an additional challenge which is
related to the identification in the execution trace of control structures (jumps,
loops, tests. . . ), that reflect the encapsulated and iterative structure of some
messages.
When messages are transferred in several packets, another challenge con-
sists in aggregating the traces in order to reconstruct the appropriate messages
for the analysis. For network inference, if the observation is performed on the
TCP layer, thus TCP segments have to be gathered in order to reconstruct
messages of an application protocol (ISO 7 layer). For application inference,
if the execution trace of the complete message is split in several traces, these
traces have to be assembled. Furthermore, (network or execution) traces may
have data from several messages, thus, the data associated to each message
have to be isolated. These two operations are referred to as data aggregation.
After the reconstruction of appropriate messages, they are grouped into
classes of messages. This clustering phase is required in order to compare
the messages that are semantically identical. This phase consists in finding a
function allowing the identification of the type of the message, from a sequence
of bytes. This typing function must take into account how close a message is
to another.
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3.3 Inference step
Message format inference is aimed at identifying, from messages of a same
type, their structure whereas the protocol grammar inference is aimed
at reconstructing, from sequences of typed messages, rules describing the ex-
changes of message classes.
For both message format and protocol grammar inference, it is also im-
portant to identify dependencies between the different fields of a message or
between messages themselves.
The ultimate goal of protocol reverse engineering process is to obtain a
specification for message format or protocol grammar. This specification is
represented by a model. It is necessary to choose a sufficiently expressive model
so that it can faithfully reflect the original specification. For instance, some
complex message formats or protocol grammars may have a tree or recursive
structure. Such a structure means that a message (in case of protocol grammar
inference) or value of a field (in the case of message format inference) depends
on other messages or other fields. This dependency is difficult to express with
finite state machine for instance. Thus, the choice of an appropriate model
is a major challenge. A bad choice may lead to a specification without any
generalization1 capabilities. Moreover, as observations are most of the time
partial, tools have to adopt approaches that are sufficiently robust so that
they can generalize the models while minimizing the over-approximation.
4 Chronological review of inference tools
Several significant advances have been achieved in protocol reverse engineering
in the past decade. The tools discussed in this paper are based on two major
contributions. The first tool PI Project [4] used bioinformatics algorithms for
inferring message formats from network traces. The second tool, Polyglot [13],
presented a new dynamic binary analysis technique for inferring message for-
mats from an execution trace generated by an application upon the processing
of selected input data. Table 1 gives an overview of the chronological evolution
of protocol reverse engineering tools that are categorized according to the type
of inference applied. It can be noticed that the majority of the tools focus on
message format inference, which is a prerequisite for protocol grammar infer-
ence. Furthermore, let us notice that active inference approaches (tools are in
bold in the table) have emerged only recently compared to passive approaches.
4.1 Inference tools based on network traces
In [4,3], Beddoe presents PI Project2, a tool for message format reverse-
engineering based on network traces. Protocol grammar inference is not cov-
1 Model generalization offers the capability to define the format of a class of messages
instead of a single instance of a message.
2 available at http://www.4tphi.net/~awalters/PI/PI.html
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Table 1 Contribution evolutions of protocol inference, classified by inference type. Tools
performing active inference are in bold.
Network based inference Application based inference
Message Protocol Message Protocol
Format Grammar Format Grammar
2004 PI Project [4,3]
2005 ScriptGen [31] ScriptGen [31]
2006 RolePlayer [22]
FFE/x86 [33]
Replayer [41]
2007 Discoverer [21]
Polyglot [13]
Rosetta [11]
2008
AutoFormat [35]
Tupni [23]
Prospex [49]
ConfigRE [45]
2009
ReFormat [48]
Prospex [20]Dispatcher [10]
Fuzzgrind [16]
2010 ASAP [29] Veritas [46] REWARDS [36] MACE [17]
2011 Howard [44] MACE [18]
ReverX [2] ReverX [2]
Netzob [8] Veritas [47]
2012 ARTISTE [9]
Netzob [26,25] Netzob [26,25]
PRISMA [28]
2013 Dispatcher [12]
2014 Netzob [7] Netzob [7] AFL [50]
2015 ARGOS [51]
10 J. Duchêne et al.
ered. This tool uses the Needleman & Wunsch [38] algorithm to align byte se-
quences of message pairs. The optimal alignment permits to identify common
parts of two messages that correspond to the same fields. This result is used
to build a tree representing the hierarchical classification of messages based
on their similarity degree (most similar messages are located on neighboring
nodes in the tree). The UPGMA [39] algorithm is used for this purpose. How-
ever, the user has to manually partition the tree to identify message classes. A
large majority of (network trace based analysis) tools developed later are built
on concepts introduced in this tool.
Soon later, ScriptGen [31,30] was developed by Leita et al. to generate a
set of scripts that simulate network protocols implemented in a server for the
Honeyd honeypot. Thus, unlike PI Project, ScriptGen requires protocol gram-
mar inference. It starts with a pre-processing phase consisting in: i) filtering
out irrelevant network packets, keeping only TCP packets corresponding to
the protocols of interest, and ii) reconstructing protocol messages from these
packets. The partitioning of messages into classes is carried out automatically
considering a threshold value. The protocol grammar inference is based on
regular languages. The resulting model is a deterministic finite automata that
contains only the most frequent responses returned by the server.
At the same period, Cui et al. presented Roleplayer [22] that is aimed at
replaying communications in different environments, in particular to study the
details of a network attack scenario. Replaying a communication involves the
adaptation of a network trace to the characteristics on the environment (e.g.,
changing the IP address, the sequence number, etc.). This requires in particular
a precise knowledge of message fields, their conformance to the environment
and their dependencies. To address this challenge, Roleplayer applies an active
inference approach during which communications are initiated by the tool in
order to identify such conformance. In addition, by applying an alignment
algorithm, the tool is able to learn the dependencies between the fields of a
message (e.g., size, cookies values, etc.). However, fields encapsulation cannot
be identified.
To cope with the difficulties to correctly identify message fields, a new ap-
proach by Cui et al. is implemented in the tool Discoverer [21]. Instead of
using Needleman & Wunsch algorithm, it is assumed that the delimiters of
message fields are known (space, CR/LF, tab, comma, etc.) which simplifies
significantly the problem. After separating message fields, the tool applies a
hierarchical and recursive classification on message fields which has the advan-
tage of identifying field encapsulations. Finally, a set of heuristics are applied
to identify field dependencies.
While most of protocol reverse engineering research address message for-
mat inference, Veritas [46,47] developed by Wang et al. focused on protocol
grammar inference. For this tool, only message classes are required, without
any information on message format. These classes are identified based on the
most frequent byte sequences observed in message headers (the first n bytes).
It is assumed that the header of a message is located at the beginning of a
message and that this header contains specific byte sequences characterizing
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message classes. This assumption, which is generally valid, enables to decrease
significantly the amount of data to be processed. This step is followed by proto-
col grammar inference itself. Authors assume that messages sent depend only
on the last message observed and not on the entire history of the communi-
cation. The model built by this tool is an automata labelled with the inferred
message classes and the probability to obtain such a message. A threshold is
used to remove message sequences occurring rarely. It is noteworthy that with
this approach, Veritas discards sequences that might correspond to unusual
data or behavior of the server. In this case, the inferred grammar is partial and
does not include all the behaviors included in the observed communications.
Similarly, ASAP [29] developed by Krueger et al. focuses on messages clas-
sification rather than their exact format inference. It was developed to improve
malware and data collected from honeypots analysis, and to help intrusion de-
tection systems design. Observed messages are split into basic tokens, based
on predefined delimiters for text messages or with fixed size tokens for bi-
nary messages. This results in the construction of an alphabet that is used to
characterize the network payload which is mapped into a vector space. Com-
munication templates (composed of conjunctions of tokens) corresponding to
base directions in this vector space are then identified. These templates give
insights into the semantics of a typical communication. Beyond the specific
techniques used e.g., to identify basic tokens, ASAP mainly differs from other
tools by the use of an algebraic approach. However, message format is not
precise and does not highlight possible links between the identified tokens and
their order of occurrence.
Later on, ASAP authors extended their tool with capabilities enabling pro-
tocol grammar inference associated to a network payload. This resulted in the
development of PRISMA3 [28]. This tool uses globally the same strategy as
ASAP. However, the algebraic analysis of messages is replaced by a classifi-
cation of messages based on a distance. A hidden Markov chain is then built
by the tool based on the observed sequences of message classes. This model is
well suited to describe protocol state changes that do not necessarily result in
the emission of messages.
Unlike the previous approaches, ReverX 4 [2] developed by Antunes et
al. uses the same approach to infer message format and protocol grammar.
Similarly to Discoverer, this tool splits the messages into fields based on a
predefined set of delimiters. An automata with loops is then generated to
model possible sequences of fields. Loops are useful to generalize the model
and include non observed messages. Such automata models message format.
A similar approach is used to build protocol grammar, from the observed
sequences of message classes. This tool has interesting features, in particular
regarding the possibility to generalize the format of the messages which is a
major challenge in protocol reverse engineering. However, the method used to
split the messages into fields is not suitable for the analysis of binary messages.
3 available at https://github.com/tammok/PRISMA
4 available at https://github.com/jasantunes/reverx
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An additional relevant tool is Netzob5 that was the subject of several
research works with multiple evolutions during the recent years. It has been
first developed to support the modeling of botnets [8]. Authors used a variant
of the Mealy machine to model protocol grammar, by including information
about the time elapsed between two observed messages. Such a grammar is
learned using an active approach based on the L∗ algorithm. The automata is
then made non-deterministic by including the probability to send a message,
given a state and a received message.
The techniques used for message clustering and message format inference
are presented in [26,25]. In particular, similarly to PI Project [4], the Needle-
man & Wunsch algorithm is used for message format inference and classifi-
cation. Authors introduced in addition an heuristic, named orphan reduction,
to perform a local alignment of two messages, without considering their en-
tire content. The inference of the message semantics is also performed, based
on similar heuristics to those used in Discoverer [21]. However, the different
attributes inferred are preserved in the message format (e.g., the encoding),
as such information can help to refine the inference. Furthermore, protocol
grammar inference is based on an active approach, while a passive approach
is used for inferring the format of the messages. In [7], major improvements
on message format inference results are obtained using an active approach.
Specific data are inserted into the application implementing the protocol and
are then searched in the messages. In addition, time correlation is used in
order to associate messages and application actions. These two means enable
them, on one hand, to identify message fields with dynamic content, and on
the other hand to associate a semantics to each message class. However, this
approach requires some extra work by the analyst which may not be easy to
automate. Finally, the paper also presents a comparative analysis of the results
with those provided by PRISMA [28] and ScriptGen [31].
Additional results are presented in [6], including in particular, a model
formalization used for messages format and protocol grammar inference, and
the development of active techniques for grammar inference. These techniques
consist in decomposing the learning of the automata into sub-automata related
in the actions performed on the system. This leads to a dramatic reduction
of the Mealy machine learning time. It is noteworthy that the tool Netzob
includes plugins to export the results under different formats, as well as for
integrated network communications fuzzing and simulation. This tool with
AFL one are the only ones to be publically available and maintained nowadays.
Furthermore, they both were used for real-world reverse-engineering, on the
malware PHP/bot for instance.
4.2 Inference tools based on application execution traces
FFE/x86 presented by Lim et al. in [33] is the first tool that was designed to
infer message format based on application analysis. The objective was to obtain
5 available at https://www.netzob.org/
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the format of the data produced by an application by means of a static analysis
of the binary code. To our knowledge, FFE/x86 remains the only tool that
adopts this approach. Moreover, it is one of the very few tools (with Rosetta,
Replayer and Dispatcher) that perform their analysis based on the outputs of
the application. More precisely, it is able to derive, from the graph of function
calls, a hierarchical automata representing the format of the messages. Then,
two static analysis techniques, VSA (Value Set Analysis) and ASI (Aggregate
Structure Identification), implemented in the tool, are used in order to obtain
an over-approximation of the values of the output data. The result of these
analyses is directly included in the model of the format of the messages. The
output of the model is presented under the form of a regular expression which
is much easier to exploit for a human analyst than a hierarchical automata.
At the same time, Newsome et al. published the RePlayer [41] tool that
was designed to replay communications in different environments. In the same
way as RolePlayer [22], the authors derive from the messages, the constraints
identifying the data linked to the environment. To perform the replay, the
authors use the constraints formula associated to a solver (STP) in order to
generate the messages that would have been produced in a novel environment.
However, the message format is not actually inferred. As a consequence, even
if the tool performs this task, it is difficult to generalize its usage to other
application domains.
The Polyglot tool published shortly after by Caballero et al. [13] adopts
a different approach for the inference of messages based on the analysis of
execution traces. This approach and the associated analysis techniques were
most of the time reused in the other tools. However, the authors do not take
into consideration the classification of messages as well as the inference of the
protocol grammar. Thus, the tool does not provide a message format per mes-
sage class. It uses heuristics in order to obtain the message semantic. Overall,
they correspond to the identification in the execution trace of patterns that
represent that semantic. The first heuristics focuses on the fields length. For
instance, an execution trace that indicates that the value of a field is used as
an upper bound for a second field lets the analyst assume that the first field
corresponds to the length of the second one. The second step enables to extract
the delimiters and the keywords of the message. For that purpose, if a byte
of the message is compared to a static value, this information is backed-up in
a table so-called token table. By analyzing this table, the delimiters and the
keywords are identified. The final step consists in gathering all this information
in order to compose the message format. This approach improves the quality
of the message format inference compared to the approaches adopted in the
previous publications, namely those based on the identification of keywords
and the splitting of the message into fields. However, even in this approach,
the message format does not reveal the fields encapsulation. The authors of
Polyglot have identified an important limitation of their tool: if the message
format is not strict, by allowing several delimiters for instance (HTTP allows
the use of spaces or tabulations as delimiters), then the execution trace does
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not necessarily correspond to the execution patterns used in the heuristics and
this flexibility of the format is not inferred in the message format.
The Rosetta [11] tool of Caballero et al. directly derives from the research
work of Polyglot and Replayer. Its main objective, likes Replayer, is to replay
communications in different environments. The authors extend the identifi-
cation of fields to the output messages of the application, by analyzing the
return values of the system calls that are used to build these output messages.
They also identify the fields with hash or checksum type, even if they do not
directly depend on the environment. Finally, they propose a new technique to
identify the fields, so-called session fields, that indicate an inter-message
dependency, by checking if some data of a received message are used to build
one of the messages sent.
Three message format inference tools, developed in parallel, build on the
research work of Polyglot : AutoFormat, Prospex and Tupni. The first one,
AutoFormat [35] from Lin et al., relies on the intuition that different fields
of a message are processed by different portions of binary code. Thus, the exe-
cution context associated to the processing of each of the fields is unique. This
tool splits the messages according to the order in which the different portions
of the code are executed, while also taking into account the encapsulation.
The message is split according to a tree in which each node represents a field.
In that way, the fields may contain sequences of fields. Finally, the tool is
able to identify parallel fields (separated by a “|” in BNF notation), which are
generally processed in portions of code that share the same execution context
history, i.e., the same stack of function calls. AutoFormat is the only tool that:
i) does not need to analyze loops, and ii) could analyze an application that
uses recursive functions to process the fields of a message. Let us note also that
this tool introduces a new challenge which consists in evaluating the distance
between several portions of code.
In the second tool, Prospex [49], Wondracek et al. present inference tech-
niques of message format. They extend the analysis of table of tokens of Poly-
glot [13] in order to identify a hierarchy of fields. Moreover, the authors rely
on the Needleman & Wunsch algorithm, applied to sequences of fields, in
order to generalize the formats obtained. This research work was pursued by
Comparetti et al. in [20] for the inference of protocols grammar. The main con-
tribution concerns the classification of messages using three metrics. The first
one, derived from the research work of Discoverer [21], defines a distance be-
tween two messages based on the alignment of sequences of fields. The second
metric measures the similarity between execution traces of messages, taking
into account that similar messages are very likely to be processed by the same
portions of binary code. Finally, the last metric measures the impact of mes-
sages on the system, notably, upon sending of data on the network, opening
files, creating directories, etc. The proposed message classification algorithm
uses the average of these three metrics as a distance between two messages.
The grammar of the protocol is represented by a finite state automata which
is built with traditional language theory techniques.
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After the publication of AutoFormat, Cui et al. have presented Tupni [23].
This tool derives from the research works of Discoverer [21], in which the au-
thors encountered difficulties to infer the semantic of fields during the reverse
of format messages based on network observation. The tool first splits the mes-
sage into different fields according to the instructions accessing these portions
of the message. Then, the fields belonging to a repeated sequence (fields sepa-
rated by * or + in BNF notation) are identified from the analysis of loops in the
program. The third step identifies the constraints on the fields of the message,
either by using the heuristics of Polyglot (static values or length fields) and
Rosetta (inter-messages dependency), or by using symbolic predicates simi-
lar to those of Replayer. The results were generalized through the analysis of
several messages. Moreover, this tool can be associated to ShieldGen [24] in
order to automatically create attack signatures for unknown vulnerabilities. It
may also enable the inference of files format by considering files as received
messages.
This approach was adopted by ConfigRE [45] of Wang et al., that con-
sider the configuration file of an application as a message received by this
application. This tool can thus be seen as a message format inference tool
based on application traces. Its main goal is the reverse of configuration of
access control used in an application, for instance the configuration of accesses
to the files of an apache server. This tool presents specificities related to its
application domain. It first splits the file into fields and tries to infer the se-
mantic of fields. The splitting into fields depends on the known delimiters.
Moreover, taking into account the application domain (access control), the
tool introduces specific matched delimiters such as: { and } or ( and ) or
<Directory> et </Directory>. The authors adopt a specific heuristic of con-
ditional jumps analysis in order to identify these elements. Furthermore, they
analyze the interaction between the tainting of the configuration file during
its memory loading and the tainting of the different test requests to identify
the fields semantic. This tool adopts an active approach to build a semantic
tree of the configuration file. Finally, it modifies the fields of the configuration
file whose semantic is permission thanks to random values, then analyzes the
new execution trace and identifies the legitimate values that these fields may
take.
At the opposite of the previous tools that take into account nonencrypted
protocols only, ReFormat [48] defined by Wang et al. focus on inferring the
format of ciphered messages. For that purpose, it must firstly identify the
ciphering functions and, in the execution trace, a memory area where the
message is deciphered. In that way, it identifies the functions possessing a large
number of arithmetic instructions which most of the time are cryptographic
functions. In their tool, the authors use the notion of lifetime of the data [19],
in order to identify the outputs of the cryptographic functions corresponding
to the unciphered message. Finally, they use their tool in combination with
AutoFormat [35] in order to automatically perform message format inference.
However, this tool only focuses on inputs data.
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Caballero et al. continued the research work of Polyglot and Rosetta by
including the enhancements from Tupni, AutoFormat, Prospex and ReFor-
mat. The resulting tool is Dispatcher [10,12]. which enables to identify the
encapsulation of fields thanks to a deeper analysis of the table of tokens pro-
posed in Polyglot. The different semantics of the inferred fields have also been
enlarged. This contribution is detailed in [14] along with a more deeper for-
malization of the inferred message format. However, this approach still suffers
from the following weaknesses: it does not make the distinction between the
fields which are useful to the transmission of messages (length, offset,
hash, checksum, delimiters...) and those which are useful for the analy-
sis (port, IP address, timestamps, name of files...). The latter fields
directly depend on the application domain while the other ones are common
to all inferences. Dispatcher was mainly designed to allow the infiltration of
botnets. However, in many cases, malware use ciphering and obfuscation. Ac-
cordingly, the techniques introduced in Reformat [48] have to be extended to
identify the ciphering functions and unciphered messages in the bot MegaD.
These extensions enabled also to address the following challenges: multiple
points of deciphering, live deciphering of portions of message, identification
of ciphering functions. Nevertheless, the use of Dispatcher is limited by the
absence of results regarding the classification of messages and the absence of
the protocol grammar inference. Also, [10] does not include any information
regarding the implementation of these contributions.
To our knowledge, MACE [17,18] is the only tool actually performing
protocol grammar inference for a concolic execution (concrete and symbolic)
of the application. Concolic execution enables to investigate the different values
that the protocol messages may take and then to build the associated grammar.
Firstly, the analysts must supply the abstraction functions of the input and
output messages. This problem was partially solved in [18], in which only
the abstraction of output messages is actually required. This tool used the
L∗ [1] algorithm to infer the protocol grammar. The authors analyzed the
protocol of MegaD botnet and discovered portions of the protocol that were
not observable when using usual analysis techniques. Even if this tool does
not allow to infer the format of the messages (only their type), it produces
instances of concrete messages in order to reach a particular level of execution.
This is useful to assess the exploitability of a vulnerability. It also enabled to
detect vulnerabilities in different applications (three in Samba 3.3.4, three in
Vino 2.26.1 and one in RealVNC 4.1.2).
As presented in section 1, smart fuzzers use a model to perform deep secu-
rity testing. In this context, Fuzzgrind6 [16,15] tries to automatically infer a
model of messages format with a symbolic execution of the application, using
Valgrind [40] framework. This symbolic execution allows to register the execu-
tion paths of the application. The main assumption is that a class of messages
corresponds to one of these paths. As a result, the constraints on the data that
guide the execution of a path reflect the format of the class of messages.
6 available at https://github.com/Grindland/Fuzzgrind
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The AFL7 [50] fuzzer infers models based on paths exploration of the
binary code. However, in this case, this exploration rely on pratical execution
and genetic algorithm to mutate entries. The quality of the mutation is directly
derived from the path exploration. This tool is used by a wide community
which discovered many different vulnerabilities.
Following these research works, some techniques have been proposed for
the inference of data structures, in particular in tools like REWARDS, Howard,
ARTISTE and ARGOS. Lin et al. are the first authors to adapt the message
format inference to the data structure inference in the REWARDS [36,34]
tool. It enables to perform forensics analysis of the memory as well as fuzzing.
For that purpose, the authors performed the same analysis of the execution
trace as in Dispatcher [10] to extract the data structure format (corresponding
to messages for Dispatcher) and the semantic of fields. However, they also had
to analyze the memory at some specific moments of the execution. So, they
extended their analysis by adding a backtrack analysis of the execution trace
in order to identify the origin of the elements in memory.
The second tool, Howard [43,44], from Slowinska et al., has been designed
to improve the debugging of binary applications. It is able to store the allocated
buffers dynamically, and identifies the way they are accessed in order to iden-
tify their splitting into different fields. This step is similar to research works
in FFE/x86 [33] or Tupni [23]. However, its dynamic analysis leads to more
precise results. Indeed, there is no over-approximation of the values taken by
the fields of the structure. Moreover, it includes an improvement of the infer-
ence of arrays presented in REWARDS and Polyglot [13] and it propagates in
the same way as REWARDS the structures derived from the known functions.
Finally, Howard can detect and prevent memory corruptions by instrumenting
the application, sometimes manually, to secure the pointers dereferencing.
Soon after, in collaboration with the authors of REWARDS, Caballero et
al. have developed ARTISTE [9]. This tool extends some of the techniques
presented in Dispatcher [10] and REWARDS [34] for the data structure and
message format inference. It can infer complex structures such as trees or
double-linked lists. It also includes a novel technique allowing to identify the
similar structures allocated in different areas of the program. Finally, it im-
proves the inference speed of simple structures.
Finally, Zeng and Lin have developed ARGOS [51] in order to improve the
understanding and monitoring of operating systems kernels. They used pre-
vious techniques presented in ARTISTE to propagate the semantic inference
for the kernel structures. Moreover, they benefit from the execution context,
i.e., the actions performed by the kernel such as the process creation or the
reading of files, in order to classify the different objects of the kernel, and give
them a comprehensible meaning for a human analyst.
7 available at http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/
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5 Classification
In the previous section, the different tools as well as the associated approaches
and methodologies were described chronologically. In this section, we propose
a classification of these tools according to four important criteria, that cor-
respond to: 1) the method used to classify messages, 2) the model used to
describe message format, 3) the model used to describe protocol grammar and
4) the passive (observing traces without purposely sending inputs to the ap-
plication) or active (sending inputs to the application and using these specific
inputs for the analysis) inference method. This classification should enable to
have better insights into the functional capabilities offered by each of these
tools comparatively to other existing tools, and also to identify technical areas
that are not sufficiently explored so far and that require further development
in the future.
The classification of messages is systematically achieved by the tools oper-
ating on network traces but more seldom by the tools operating on application
execution traces. Messages classification is most of the time done automatically
but some tools adopt or refine this classification manually.
Regarding the inference models used, the most important point is their
ability to represent all the characteristics of the protocol specification. Message
format is often more complex to analyze due to the dependencies that may
exist between fields. Three different models can be distinguished:
– Template: specific pattern describing the general structure of the format of
a message
– Annoted tree: a hierachical template represented as a tree in order to de-
scribe the encapsulation of fields
– Finite State Machine (FSM): a more powerful representation which can
be represented under different forms (Regular Expression, Deterministic
Finite Automata, Non Deterministic Finite Automata, Mealy Machines,
Hidden Markov Chains, etc.).
5.1 Classification of inference tools based on network traces
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.1 summarize the different approaches used by protocol
reverse engineering tools based on network traces. Network inference is mainly
based on: 1) sequence alignment techniques to decompose messages into fields
and cluster them into message classes, 2) some heuristics to infer the semantics
of the message strings and intra-message dependencies, and 3) an approach
based on regular languages for the inference of the protocol grammar. Sev-
eral tools use similar techniques. Recently, new significant approaches have
been adopted by different tools. In particular, the active approach used by
RolePlayer and Netzob allows them to improve the decomposition of messages
into fields. Nevertheless, only ReverX uses the same technique for message
format and protocol grammar inference. Finally, PRISMA and Netzob use
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probabilistic models to take into account non-determinism of some exchanges,
mainly due to environment influence on some transactions.
As regards the inference of messages format (Table 3), at the exception of
Veritas which does not cover this step, overall, the model used for this purpose
generally corresponds to templates. Some of the associated inference tech-
niques support model generalization. Unfortunately, such templates are not
expressive enough to model important features such as dependencies between
messages and encapsulations (the corresponding column of Table 3 reflects this
shortcoming). Indeed, to model such characteristics, either the model must be
enriched with semantic information, or the tool must use a richer model such
as context-free grammars. These grammars are well suited to model encap-
sulation, such as in XML or JSON type messages for instance. However, the
learning complexity for these models is more important than the ones used
in the tools so far [27]. Netzob tackles this challenge using some heuristics in
order to retrieve some specific dependencies. Still, this is an open issue which
is worth exploring.
Table 2 Inference tools based on network traces: message classification strategies
Tools Analysis method
Messages classification
technique
PI Project Passive
Alignment,
manual classification
ScriptGen Passive
Alignment,
automatic classification
RolePlayer Active
Alignment,
automatic classification
Discoverer Passive
Delimiters,
automatic classification
Veritas Passive
Recursive decomposition in fixed size strings,
automatic classification
ReverX Passive
Delimiters,
automatic classification
ASAP Passive
Delimiters or decomposition,
automatic classification
PRISMA Passive
Delimiters or decomposition,
automatic classification
Netzob Active
Alignment, automatic classification,
allow analyst interaction
5.2 Classification of inference tools based on application execution traces
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 summarize the different approaches used by protocol re-
verse engineering tools based on application traces analysis. Tables 10 and 11
identifies the tools performing data structure inference. These tables empha-
size that FFE/X86 is the only tool performing a static analysis of the binary
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Table 3 Inference tools based on network traces: message format strategies
Tools
Message Format
Dependencies between fields Model used Model Generalization
PI Project no Template yes
ScriptGen no Template yes
RolePlayer no Template no
Discoverer yes without encapsulation Annotated Tree yes
Veritas - - -
ReverX no FSM yes
ASAP no Template no
PRISMA no Template no
Netzob yes Annotated Tree yes
Table 4 Inference tools based on network traces: protocol grammar inference strategies
Tools Protocol Grammar Model
PI Project -
ScriptGen FSM (Deterministic)
RolePlayer -
Discoverer -
Veritas FSM (Probabilistic/Deterministic)
ReverX FSM (Deterministic)
ASAP -
PRISMA FSM (Hidden Markov chains)
Netzob FSM (Non Deterministic Mealy machines)
code, while the other tools adopt a dynamic approach, mostly in a passive
way. Moreover, tools mostly focus on message format inference and do not
consider message classification, which constitutes a limit to perform protocol
grammar inference. As a consequence, only Prospex and MACE, which clas-
sify messages, are able to infer protocol grammar. As regards the inference of
message format, only MACE does not cover this step. The model used by the
other tools to support the inference process consists of specific templates or
message field annotated trees. The proposed approaches take into account pos-
sible dependencies between message fields, and for most of them the analysis
is performed based on application inputs.
Let us note finally that an extension of these tools to address new ap-
plication domains (file format inference, data structure inference) has been
proposed in several tools (Tupni, REWARDS, Howard, ARTISTE and AR-
GOS ).
Obviously, limitations in this area are more important than the ones in the
previous case of inference based on network traces, particularly because of the
lack of a clear delimitation of the messages (a message can be stored in stack
memory, heap memory, in registers, etc.). The main limitation is the lack of
message classification. This is an interesting perspective to explore in future
research.
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Table 5 Summary of major contributions for network inference tools and their usage con-
text.
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Table 6 Inference tools based on applications execution traces: analysis method and mes-
sage classification strategies
Tools Analysis method
Message classification
technique
FFE/x86 static -
Replayer active/dynamic -
Polyglot passive/dynamic -
Rosetta passive/dynamic -
AutoFormat passive/dynamic -
Prospex passive/dynamic Alignment and application behavior
Tupni passive/dynamic -
ConfigRE active/dynamic -
Dispatcher passive/dynamic -
MACE active/concolic Manual abstraction of produced messages
Fuzzgrind active/symbolic -
AFL active/dynamic -
Table 7 Inference tools based on execution application: message format inference strategies
Tools
Message Format
Inputs or Dependencies
Model used
Model
Outputs between fields generalization
FFE/x86 Outputs yes
FSM
yes
(Regular expression)
Replayer Both yes Template no
Poloyglot Inputs yes Template no
Rosetta Both yes Template no
AutoFormat Inputs yes Annotated tree yes
Prospex Inputs yes Annotated tree yes
Tupni Inputs yes Annotated tree yes
ConfigRE Inputs yes Annotated tree yes
Dispatcher Both yes Annotated tree no
MACE - - - -
Fuzzgrind Inputs yes No visualization -
AFL Inputs yes
Interractive model of
yes
memory representation
6 Conclusion
In recent years, many protocol reverse engineering tools have been developed.
They have been applied to different application domains and have been ex-
tended to infer complex data structures in the most recent work. While the
pre-processing of collected traces still requires a significant investment of the
analyst, the inference step itself is increasingly automated and no longer re-
quires human intervention.
Research is still focused on the inference of the message format. Indeed,
there are a few tools that infer the protocol grammar and most of these tools
are based on network traces analysis. This is due to a large volume of complex
data to be processed in order to infer the protocol grammar based on the
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Table 8 Inference tools based on execution applications traces: protocol grammar inference
strategies
Tools Protocol Grammar Model
FFE/x86 -
Replayer -
Polygloy -
Rosetta -
Rosetta -
AutoFormat -
Prospex FSM (Deterministic)
ConfigRE -
Dispatcher -
MACE FSM (Deterministic Mealy machines)
Fuzzgrind -
AFL -
analysis of application traces. In addition, some message formats and protocol
grammars may be very complex to analyze due to encapsulation and strong
dependencies between fields. However, the models used to infer the message
format and the protocol grammar are equivalent to finite automata and they
may not be expressive enough to represent all the characteristics of the original
specification.
While significant advances have been achieved so far in the area of protocol
reverse engineering, there are still some open questions that need to be fur-
ther explored to address the challenges discussed in Section 3. Furthermore,
it would be interesting to address the inference of more complex data such as
algebraic grammars or to identify unencrypted data when parsing messages.
For this last challenge, other approaches based on the measurement of the
entropy of the data could be explored. Finally, a large majority of the studied
tools rely on message clustering techniques. Such techniques have been pre-
sented in these different tools, but the classification of messages has not been
considered as a relevant challenge by these tools up to now. We believe that a
comparative study of the various clustering techniques could greatly improve
the protocol reverse engineering methodology.
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Table 9 Summary of major contributions for applicative inference tools and their usage
context.
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AutoFormat
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location execution
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Needleman & Wunsch algorithm
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